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INTRODUCTION

As recent events illustrate, the question of ethics rules and
allegations of sexual orientation bias is a live one.1 These events have
highlighted important questions about the role of Canons of Ethics
and Professional Responsibility Codes in ensuring fairness in the
legal system. Additionally, they have raised important issues about
the potential effect of such rules on substantive law. Elsewhere, I
have examined the content of State Codes of Judicial Conduct and
Rules of Professional Responsibility in an attempt to elucidate a
general consensus among elite opinion-shapers in the legal
profession.2 Based on the intriguing work of Professor Jennifer
Gerarda Brown, I have noted that there is a significant argument that
such rules might have substantive legal effect beyond merely
3
regulating the legal profession.
This Article will return to the question of the potential substantive
effect of legal professional responsibility provisions to explore the
limits of such provisions. First, I will discuss a continuum of
understandings of the possible meanings of the provisions. Then, I
will examine these different possibilities and their implications. I will
conclude by suggesting that the effects of such provisions are, and
should be, severely limited.
I.

POSSIBLE MEANING OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION BIAS PROVISIONS

The current structure and understanding of legal ethics rules is
4
relatively new. In 1972, the American Bar Association ( ABA )
1. See Jay Reeves, Gay Rights Group Accuses Alabama Chief Justice of Bias, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 22, 2002, at 17 [hereinafter Reeves, Gay Rights] (describing why a gay
rights group charged a judge with violating judicial rules in Alabama). Chief Justice
Roy Moore labeled homosexuality an  inherent evil in a written opinion in a child
custody case. Ex parte H.H., No. 1002045, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 44, at *1 (Feb. 15, 2002).
The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund challenged these comments, stating
that the comments demonstrated Chief Justice Moores prejudice and lack of
impartiality. Reeves, Gay Rights, supra note 1.
2. See generally William C. Duncan, A Lawyer Class: Views on Marriage And
Sexual Orientation in the Legal Profession, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 137 (2001) (presenting
various viewpoints on sexual orientation and the law on bias from members of the
legal community).
3. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reforms from Small Rules? Anti-Bias
Canons as a Substitute for Heightened Scrutiny, 85 MINN . L. REV. 363, 365-71 (2000)
(discussing the possible effects of a procedural rule on gay rights litigation); see also
Duncan, supra note 2, at 155 (discussing the possibility that the implementation of a
procedural rule on gay rights litigation may favor homosexual litigants).
4. See Nancy L. Sholes, Judicial Ethics: A Sensitive Subject, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
379, 381-85 (1992) (explaining that the first formal Canon of Judicial Ethics was
promulgated in 1924 by a committee of the American Bar Association).
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House of Delegates adopted a Code of Judicial Conduct that has
5
been adopted with some alterations in the vast majority of states. In
1990, the ABAs revisions to the Code included creating a prohibition
6
on sexual orientation bias in Canon 3. As a result, sexual orientation
7
bias by judges is specifically prohibited in at least thirty jurisdictions.
Nationally, the first formal professional responsibility rules were
promulgated in Alabama as the Code of Ethics of the Alabama State
Bar in 1887.8 In 1908, the ABA promulgated its Canons of
9
Professional Responsibility. In 1969, the Canons were replaced by a
10
This Code was
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
substantially revised in 1983 and has been adopted as the Rules of
11
Professional Conduct in some form by the majority of states. As of
2001, sixteen states had included some prohibition of sexual

5. See Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Misconduct: Ethical Rule Usage Leads to Regulation
of the Legal Profession, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1323, 1330-33 (1998) (discussing the adoption
of the Code of Judicial Conduct and its function in aiding the judiciary in
 establishing and enforcing proper standards of conduct ).
6. See Brown, supra note 3, at 375-76 (describing the development of the law
regarding the Code of Judicial Conduct and noting the lack of controversy
surrounding the inclusion of sexual orientation in the anti-bias provisions).
7. See AK R CJC Canon 3 (1998); AZ S CT Rule 81, CJC Canon 3 (1993); AZ S
CT Rule 81, CJC Canon 4 (1993); CA ST J ETHICS Canon 3 (1996); CA ST J ETHICS
Canon 4 (1997); CO ST CHC Canon 3 (1990); DE R CJC Canon 3 (1995); GA R CJC
Canon 3 (1994); HI R S CT EX B CJC Canon 3 (1992); HI R S CT EX B CJC Canon 4
(1992); ID R CJC Canon 2 (1995); KS R RULE 601A Canon 3 (1995); KS R RULE 601A
Canon 4 (1995); KY ST S CT Rule 4.300, CJC Canon 3 (1978); ME R CJC Canon 3
(2001); MD R CTS J & ATTYS CJC Canon 3 (1999); MA R S CT RULE 3:09 CJC
Canon 3 (1998); MN ST CJC Canon 3 (1993); NE R CJC Canon 3 (1996); NE R CJC
Canon 4 (1996); NV ST S CT CJC Canon 3 (2000); NV ST S CT CJC Canon 4 (2000);
NJ R CJC Canon 5 (1998); NM R CJC Rule 21-300 (1995); NY R CHIEF ADMIN S
100.3 (1996); ND R CJC Canon 3 (1994); ND R CJC Canon 4 (1994); OH ST CJC
Canon 3 (1997); OK ST CJC Canon 3 (1997); RI R S CT ART VI CJC Canon 3
(1997); RI R S CT ART VI CJC Canon 4 (1997); TN R S CT RULE 10 CJC 3 (1997);
TN R S CT RULE 10 CJC 4 (1997); TX ST CJC Canon 3 (1999); VT R CJC Canon 3
(2000); WV ST CJC Canon 3 (1993); WI ST CJC SCR 60.04 (1996); WY R CJC Canon
3 (1991); see also In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1994).
8. See Podgor, supra note 5, at 1326 n.17 (tracing the historical development of
formal ethical codes).
9. See id. at 1326-28 (discussing the formation of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility and emphasizing that the Canons were viewed as a guide, not as
mandatory authority).
10. See id. at 1326-29 (describing the three levels of review in the Code and the
overwhelming acceptance that the Code received from the states). The three levels
of review in the Code are,  [t]he Canons . . . are axiomatic norms; the Disciplinary
Rules are mandatory in character; and the ethical considerations are aspirational in
nature. Id.
11. See id. at 1326-28 (noting that the Rules stress self-regulation and autonomy
in the legal profession, whereas the Code, which was revised due to its numerous
deficiencies, was ambiguous on the issues of judgment and enforcement of ethical
rules).
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orientation bias in their professional responsibility codes.
Both judicial conduct canons and professional responsibility codes
originated as guides that were not legally enforceable. The 1908 ABA
13
Canons of Professional Responsibility were  non-obligatory.
Similarly, the 1924 Canon of Judicial Ethics was intended to  guide
14
behavior rather than be an enforceable set of rules. The Canons
take on legal significance only if they are adopted statutorily or in
15
court rules. Provisions allowing for disciplinary proceedings were
not included until states adopted the Code of Professional Conduct
16
as Rules.
A. Possible Interpretations of the Amendments
There is little case law discussing the specific effect of the sexual
17
orientation bias provisions in the Canons and Rules.
Three
representative reported cases describe situations where a judge has
been disqualified from hearing a case because of concerns with bias
based on a partys sexual orientation. In a Florida case, Rucks v.
18
State, the judge allegedly referred to a same-sex relationship as a
19
 sick situation and the defendant sought the judges removal. The
Florida Court of Appeals held that the defendants fear of bias by the
judge was well grounded and requested that the judge remove
20
himself so that another judge could be assigned. In a Nebraska
12. See A Z. R USBCT Rule 1000-1 (1996); A Z. R USDCT Rule 1.20 (1994); C A . R
USDCTSD CivLR 83.4 (1997); C OLO. ST RPC Rule 1.2 (1999); DC R RPC Rule 9.1
(2002); F LA. ST BAR Rule 4-8.4 (1994); MN ST GEN PRAC Rule 2.03 (1998); NJ R
RPC 8.4 (1994); NM R RPC Rule 16-300 (1994); NY ST CPR DR 1-102 (2002); OHIO
ST CPR DR 1-102 (1995); TX ST CPR DR 5.08 (1998); VT R CJC Canon 2 (1994);
WASH. R RPC 8.4 (2000).
13. See Podgor, supra note 5, at 1326 (noting that the Preamble of the Canons
emphasized that the Canons were to be used as a  general guide ).
14. See Sholes, supra note 4, at 381-82 (noting the purpose of the 1924 Canon of
Judicial Ethics and its limited enforcement potential).
15. See id. at 384-85 (describing the Canons introduction of clearer rules and
guidelines, but noting they have no legal significance unless they are formally
adopted).
16. See id. at 1328-30 (explaining the transformation of the Code into disciplinary
rules with sanctions).
17. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 150-54 (exploring case law addressing the effects
of sexual orientation bias provisions).
18. 692 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1997).
19. See id. at 976-77 (recounting the trial judges comment about Ms. Rucks
sexual orientation at her probation hearing that  [t]his is a sick situation and
 [i]f this is the family of 1997, heaven help us. ).
20. See id. at 977 (explaining that a judge must be disqualified  if the facts
alleged demonstrate merely that the movant has a well-grounded fear that he or she
will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. ).
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21

case, State v. Pattno, the judge read a Bible passage that expressed
disapproval of homosexual relations in the sentencing of an alleged
22
Because the Nebraska Supreme Court felt the
child molester.
biblical passage was irrelevant and its use troubling, given the need
for separation of church and state, the sentence was vacated and the
23
case remanded for consideration by another judge. In Illinois, a
judge hesitated in granting a  second parent joint adoption by two
same-sex couples and added, sua sponte, the Family Research
24
Council ( FRC ) as a party in the case. In In re C.M.A., the Illinois
Court of Appeals held that the addition of the FRC was illogical and
without legal justification and that the disqualification of the judge
25
was justified by her  predetermined bias against lesbians.
The clearest exposition of the general meaning of  bias or
prejudice of judges comes from the United States Supreme Court
26
decision in Liteky v. United States, which construed the federal
27
judicial disqualification standard. In that case, criminal defendants
argued that the judge showed bias when he tried to limit political
speeches during trial and otherwise evidenced impatience with
28
defendants and their counsel. The Supreme Court defined  bias or
prejudice as more than just unfavorable feelings, requiring that bias
be wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved,
excessive or based on knowledge that should not be available to the
21. 579 N.W.2d 503 (Neb. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999) (holding that
where a judges comments could cause a reasonable person to believe there is
improper bias, the defendant has been deprived of due process and the judge
abused his discretion).
22. See id. at 505-06 (referring to the trial judges reading of a biblical passage,
after which the judge stated that imprisonment of the defendant was necessary as a
public protection mechanism and to indicate the severity of the crime).
23. See id. at 509.
24. See In re C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d 674, 678 (Ill. App. 1999) (explaining that the
Family Research Council ( FRC ) was added as a  second guardian who was to
represent the minor childrens interests). The judge stated that she added the FRC
because they stand for the proposition  that adoptions by . . . persons living a
homosexual lifestyle are not in the best interests of children, a position she
believed needed to be advocated. Id.
25. Id. at 679.
26. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
27. See id. at 554 (holding that the  extrajudicial source doctrine applies to the
federal recusal provision for judges, § 455(a), and concluding that the fact a judge
possesses an opinion developed from a source outside of the judicial proceedings is
not a necessary or sufficient condition to require a judge to recuse himself).
28. See id. at 542 (explaining how the defendants argued that the judge was
prejudiced against them because of limits placed on the defense counsel, including
among other actions, limiting defense counsels cross-examination, commenting that
opening and closing arguments were not a  political forum, and interrupting
defense counsel during the closing argument).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2002

5

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 7
DUNCAN_FINAL

90

11/20/02 4:15 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE L AW [Vol. 11:1
29

judge. Thus, a judge who forms negative judgements of the parties
in the course of judicial proceedings does not show inappropriate
30
bias. The Court held that the law provided no general prohibition
of prejudice  because the pejorative connotation of the terms bias
and prejudice demands that they be applied only to judicial
31
predispositions that go beyond what is normal and acceptable.
The Court also clarified that certain things will not establish bias: (1)
 the judges view of the law acquired in scholarly reading, and (2)
32
judicial rulings.
The most important examination of the range of possible
meanings of the sexual orientation bias provisions appears in the
article by Professor Brown mentioned above. In the article, Professor
Brown argues that there are three kinds of bias that would be affected
by Canon 3: (1) disrespect toward litigants, (2) biased fact-finding
(inappropriate generalizations about litigants and reliance on biased
social science), and (3) biased application of substantive laws
(applying laws disfavoring homosexuals when not constrained to do
33
so by unequivocal statutory language or precedent).
B. A Continuum of Types of Bias
Professor Browns argument, the Liteky decision and the sparse case
law present a continuum of potential meanings of the sexual
orientation bias provisions. I would propose the points on the
continuum as: (1) a prohibition of name-calling and outright bias,
(2) a prohibition of irrelevant notice by the judge of the sexual
orientation of litigants or third-parties, (3) an implied requirement of
generalized favoring of homosexual parties, and (4) a use of the rules
34
as a  substitute for heightened scrutiny.
1.

Name-calling

The first kind of bias is obvious and clearly inappropriate. This
seems to be what the Florida Supreme Court was concerned about in
35
The court noted the judges reference to the
the Rucks case.
29. See id. at 550-51.
30. See id. at 550-51 (indicating that  [n]ot all unfavorable disposition towards an
individual . . . amounts to bias or prejudice).
31. Id. at 552.
32. See id. at 554-55.
33. See Brown, supra note 3, at 370.
34. See id. at 367.
35. See Rucks v. State, 692 So. 2d 976, 977-78 (Fla. 1997) (addressing the trial
judges comments regarding Ms. Rucks and her sexuality); see also supra text
accompanying notes 19-20.
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same-sex relationship as a  sick situation and his observation that
36
Arguably, these
 [i]f this is the family of 1997, heaven help us.
comments might have been enough for the court to find that the
judge had exhibited bias. It is important to note, though, that the
37
court did not specifically mention Canon 3s provision.
The
decision may reflect a concern not with the judges bias against the
defendants sexual orientation, but merely with bias against this
particular defendant, irrespective of any class to which she might
belong. It is also important to note that the type of bias in this first
category is easy to identify because it involves some kind of obvious
action on the part of the judge, generally an inappropriate comment.
This type of bias would be prohibited regardless of whether sexual
orientation is actually mentioned in the bias provision.
2.

Irrelevant notice of sexual orientation

The second type of bias may have been the concern of the Pattno
38
case. However, since the court did not specifically find that the
judge engaged in sexual orientation bias, it is not clear that the court
39
was concerned with this bias. The court did note that while the
passage read by the judge was about homosexuality, the crime alleged
was child molestation; accordingly, the court held that the passage
40
was irrelevant to the crime at issue.
This may indicate that the
courts concern was with the judges raising a sexual orientation
matter that was not relevant to the case. One could also argue that
this was the problem in Rucks, because the underlying case was about
a domestic dispute that did not raise any questions of
41
homosexuality. This kind of bias is also relatively easy to identify,
such as when a judge hearing a criminal case refers to the sexual
orientation of the defendant when the underlying crime has nothing
to do with sexuality. As with name-calling, this type of bias could be
found even where a states bias provisions do not specifically
enumerate sexual orientation as a discrete classification. Some of
36. Rucks, 692 So. 2d at 977.
37. See id. (failing to discuss Canon 3s prohibition on sexual orientation bias in
determining whether the trial judge was prejudiced against Ms. Rucks).
38. See State v. Pattno, 579 N.W.2d 503 (Neb. 1998).
39. See id. at 505-06, 509 (addressing whether statements of religious expression
by a judge can be evidence of bias or prejudice).
40. See id. at 508 (examining the test and standard employed in a bias
determination). The Court determined that bias is established when a  reasonable
person would conclude that the judge was biased toward one party. See id.
(discussing the adoption of the  reasonable person test).
41. See Rucks, 692 So. 2d at 976 (stating that the case resulted from a dispute
between Ms. Rucks and the daughter or her live-in female companion).
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what Professor Brown identifies as biased fact-finding may actually fit
in this category, such as when a judge assumes negative factors
weighing against a litigant merely because that litigant appears to
42
have a certain sexual orientation.
3.

Preference for homosexual litigants

The third category, an implicit requirement of generalized favor
toward homosexual parties, has not been specifically advanced in any
particular interpretation of the rules but may be implicit in the
expansive reading of the anti-bias provisions. For instance, Professor
Browns solution to the problem of biased judicial notice is  to
prohibit judges from taking judicial notice of facts about
43
homosexuality to the detriment of gay or lesbian litigants. Taken
literally, this solution could be read to compel a judge to be more
exacting in a requirement of proof with some classes of litigants than
with others. While no one has argued that a court cannot assume
that a cohabiting opposite-sex couple are engaged in an intimate
relationship, Professor Brown seems to argue that to do so with a
44
similarly situated same-sex couple would be disallowed. More to the
point, a judge charged with determining the best interests of the
child in a custody dispute may appropriately consider relationships in
which the parent seeking custody is involved and weigh them as
either beneficial or detrimental to the child. In the formulation
suggested by Professor Brown, that would not be possible if the
relationship was a same-sex relationship and was not egregiously
promiscuous.45
This requirement of favor may have been at work in In re C.M.A., as
the court arguably could have relied on the fact that the judge
seemed clearly uncomfortable with the idea of adoption by same-sex
46
Another example of the favor requirement is a
couples.
Massachusetts case in which a judge ordered a home study in an
42. See Brown, supra note 3, at 388-416 (discussing explicit bias by judges made
evident through distortions of findings of fact).
43. Id. at 405.
44. See id. at 390-91 (arguing that many judges construe homosexuality only in
terms of sexual conduct and that, as a result, they view a person identifying as gay or
lesbian as violating criminal sodomy statutes).
45. See id. at 425-26 (indicating that a judge could consider the promiscuity of a
parent as a factor affecting the well being of a child).
46. See In re C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ill. App. 1999) (arguing that the
problem at issue was the irrelevance of the parties sexual orientation as described in
the second category since Illinois law seemed to treat sexual orientation as irrelevant
in adoption cases). However, the facts of this case are so unique that it may not
reveal anything about the state of the law regarding judicial bias. Id.
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adoption petition by a same-sex couple. Although the standard for
reversing a trial courts decision not to waive a home study is that the
judge abused her discretion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court remanded for a detailed explanation of the failure to waive the
home study without finding abuse of discretion based merely on an
48
unsupported claim that bias motivated the denial.
Unlike the first two categories, this implied requirement of favor is
obviously a much more controversial proposition. It moves from
what is traditionally thought of as bias or prejudice (prohibited favor
or disfavor for a party or class of persons) into a requirement that a
court actually favor a certain class of litigants which would involve a
judge taking a substantive legal position.
4.

Bias provision as constitutional standard

The final category moves even further from the traditional
understanding of the reach of bias provisions. It posits that Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct can act as a  substitute for either a
constitutional amendment or Supreme Court holding that
classifications on the basis of sexual orientation should be subjected
49
to heightened scrutiny.
Thus, the anti-bias provision becomes a
 supplement to constitutional law, and arguably an actual
50
constitutional mandate.
This reading would require judges to
refuse to follow precedent deemed to be  anti-gay if it predates the
51
adoption of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Professor Brown notes
that construal of the provisions in this manner would actually make
them a kind of constitutional law plus, since they would not only
affect substantive law, but also result in the discipline of a judge who
52
rules in favor of an  anti-gay law without being compelled to do so.
47. See, e.g., In re Galen, 680 N.E.2d 70, 72 (Mass. 1997) (noting that the Probate
Court ordered a home study to be conducted, despite having authority under state
law to grant a waiver of the home study when one of the parties petitioning for the
adoption is a parent).
48. See id. at 73 (explaining that the case was remanded for further inquiry
because the probate court did not explain with specificity the reasons for denying the
motion to waive the home study).
49. See generally Brown, supra note 3, at 424-27.
50. See id. at 436-37 (explaining that Canon 3 is a non-constitutional means of
forcing judges to avoid basing decisions on a general condemnation of or distaste for
homosexuality).
51. See id. at 431-32 (noting that both appellate level and Supreme Court cases
that pre-date the Code of Judicial Conduct would lose credibility, allowing judges to
rule inconsistently with previous opinions).
52. See id. at 438-40 (arguing that Canon 3 creates an additional layer of
incentives and subjects judges who allow an anti-homosexual bias to enter the
proceedings to disciplinary sanctions).
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This understanding of the reach of anti-bias provisions is far removed
from any kind of traditional understanding of judicial fairness.
II. L IMITATIONS OF BIAS PROVISIONS
The standard employed in Liteky appears to set a very high
threshold for finding bias sufficient to require removal of a judge
53
from a case. Arguably, this standard would only be invoked in the
case of conduct in the first two categories of the continuum set out
above. Even if the exacting standard of Liteky was not the rule in a
given state, it seems clear that establishing bias by a judge is difficult
54
under most formulations. Any existing standard would specifically
disclaim any substantive legal effect for provisions beyond a
determination of whether a judge showed bias in a specific instance.
It would certainly not suggest that anti-bias provisions would affect
other laws.
The wisdom of a stringent test for bias is manifest in the important
policies advanced by a narrow understanding of the scope of the bias
provisions. Conversely, the expansive constructions of the bias
provisions outlined above should be resisted to the degree they
conflict with these crucial policy considerations.
A. Fairness
The most obvious value promoted by ethics rules is ensuring
fairness to litigants and other participants in the court system. To
promote fairness, it is crucial to ensure that flagrant and
unreasonable bias is not allowed to damage the judicial process.
However, some of the proposed readings of current anti-bias
provisions would actually undermine the fairness of the system. If
judges are required to look with favor on certain classes of litigants, a
system of reverse discrimination is created. For instance, if a party to
a custody dispute sincerely believes that the same-sex intimate
relationship of his or her ex-spouse is causing harm to their children
and can offer good faith evidence that this is the case, it would be
unfair not to allow a judge to hear this evidence merely because the
other party is identified as a member of a discrete class in the Code of
Judicial Conduct or Rules of Professional Responsibility.
53. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1994) (requiring bias or
prejudice be wrongful or inappropriate); see also supra notes 26-32 and accompanying
text.
54. See id. at 557-58 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the
reviewing court must have reasonable grounds to question the neutral and objective
character of a judges ruling or findings).
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B. Separation of Powers
Central to the constitutional system of the United States is the
concept that the separate branches of government are to operate
within the spheres constitutionally allotted to them without
infringing on the roles of the other branches. A regime in which
certain outcomes in court cases are mandated by ethics rules would
threaten this principle. Professor Brown gives the example of a court
determination that a certain contract would be void as against public
policy to illustrate a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct unless
the law specifically requires that result and was enacted since the
adoption of Canon 3 in that jurisdiction.55 This would require a court
to ignore contrary policy pronouncements by the legislature and
make their own law on certain subjects. It would prevent judicial
restraint, and in fact even mandate judges not to act with deference to
legislative policies for fear they might be subject to discipline for
doing so. At the very least, it would allow judges to ignore legislative
direction they deem to be not  clear enough. In addition, such a
rule would threaten the independence of the judiciary by requiring
the judge to take into account the view of the disciplinary
commission in making his decisions rather than looking to the
56
substantive law on the matter at hand.
C. Constitutional Amendment Process
The idea that an anti-bias rule could be a  substitute for
heightened scrutiny allows for an amendment to a state or federal
constitution without following the established procedures for such an
amendment. Rather than representing a straightforward attempt to
make new constitutional policy by changing the nature of the
document, a constitutional principle of nondiscrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation would be added at the behest of an
extremely small set of lawyers who are responsible for promulgating
the ethics rules in a particular jurisdiction.
For instance, another example of biased judging used by Professor
Brown is a situation in which a judge relies on the fact that a litigant
57
is not married to deny rights available to married persons. This is
55. See Brown, supra note 3, at 427-28 (describing a decision by the Supreme
Court of Georgia that voided a pre-nuptial-type contract between two lesbians
because the relationship was  illegal and immoral ).
56. See Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L.
REV. 949, 962-63 (1996) (arguing that judges would be too concerned with what was
proper in terms of the disciplinary commissions powers).
57. See Brown, supra note 3, at 426 n.269 (arguing that a judge could use a factor
such as marriage to disadvantage homosexuals in child custody disputes, because
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labeled as bias because the decision would have a  disparate impact
on homosexual persons since they cannot marry another person of
the same-sex.
Employing the disparate impact analysis for
determining discrimination runs counter to the precedent governing
58
federal constitutional law. Only one state appellate court has ever
applied the disparate impact analysis in the context of a sexual
orientation discrimination claim as a matter of constitutional
59
interpretation. Such a radical departure from this clear precedent
should only be made through the appropriate amendment process
rather than the promulgation of a rule of ethics.
D. Popular Sovereignty
Closely related to the concern with the constitutional amendment
process is another crucial principle of government the need for the
governed to consent to laws made in their name. Thus, lawmaking
power is reserved to the legislature because legislators are directly
accountable to the people who elect them. Again, lawmaking by
judges pursuant to an ethics mandate would threaten this concept. It
would give cover to activist judges seeking certain results in cases
when the law is contrary to their position. To paraphrase another
ethical concern for attorneys, it would encourage the  unauthorized
practice of lawmaking.
Recent controversies indicate that this is not an idle concern. For
instance, when the Massachusetts attorney generals office recently
argued in favor of that states marriage law and against an attempt to
have the law redefined to include same-sex couples, local activists
60
accused the state attorney of homophobia. One said,  I dont think
that Jerry Falwell could have made arguments that were any more
61
mean-spirited. In addition, activists criticized the attorney general
they do not have the opportunity to marry their partners).
58. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 82-83 (2001) (OConnor, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Supreme Court does not apply heightened scrutiny to facially
neutral laws, despite the fact that they may have a disparate impact); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (indicting that a facially neutral law is not
unconstitutional solely because it has a disparate impact on a certain race).
59. See Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 443 (Or. App. 1998)
(applying disparate impact analysis in a matter concerning the granting of health
insurance and other benefits to the partners of homosexual employees).
60. See Laura Kiritsy, Activists Blast Reillys Marriage Positions, BAY WINDOWS, Mar. 7,
2002 (discussing gay and lesbian rights activists responses to the Massachusetts
attorney generals arguments against changing that states marriage law to include
available
at
same-sex
couples),
http://baywindows.com/main.
cfm?include=detail&shryid=2206538.
61. Id. (quoting Gary Duffin, co-chair of the Massachusetts Gay and Lesbian
Political Caucus).
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for certifying a proposed constitutional amendment defining
marriage, even though that amendment received far more than the
62
number of signatures needed to put it before the legislature. What
is not mentioned in the news account of this criticism is the fact that
defending state law and certifying proposed constitutional
amendments are legal requirements of the attorney generals job.
Activists would thus like to tar the attorney general as unethical for
doing what the law requires. If they succeed, they will have created a
new rule of law without the difficult process of enacting legislation
favorable to their point of view.
Similarly, numerous groups have attacked Chief Justice Roy Moore
of the Alabama Supreme Court for arguing that Alabama law strongly
63
disfavors homosexual behavior. Interestingly, none of these groups
have actually taken issue with Chief Justice Moores description of the
state of Alabama law. Alabama law, which prohibits consensual
sodomy between persons of the same sex, same-sex marriage, and
even allows custody decisions to be made on the basis of a concern
with a parents homosexuality, seems to disfavor homosexual
64
relations. Thus, it would take a stretch to argue that a judge who
points out the possibility that Alabama law disfavors homosexual
behavior should be removed from office. Indeed, Chief Justice
Moores opinion merely concurs with the unanimous decision
65
denying custody to a woman in a same-sex partnership.
News
reports indicate that this may be the basis of the Judicial Inquiry
Commissions decision not to pursue the bias complaint against Chief
66
Justice Moore.
62. See id. (citing gay-rights activists who are critical of Massachusetts Attorney
General Thomas Reillys allowance of a petition for an  anti-gay constitutional
amendment entitled  Protection of Marriage ).
63. See Reeves, Gay Rights, supra note 1 (noting that one organization that has
been critical of Chief Justice Moore, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, filed an ethics complaint against him with the Judicial Inquiry Commission);
see also Jim Maynard, Specter of Taliban Raised in Alabama Judges Attack on Gays,
C OMMERCIAL A PPEAL (Memphis), Mar. 1, 2002, at B5 (comparing Chief Justice
Moores characterizations of homosexuals to those used by the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan).
64. See, e.g., Ex parte H.H., No. 1002045, 2002 WL 227956, *6-*7 (Ala. Feb. 15,
2002) (Moore, C.J., specially concurring) (discussing the criminalization of
homosexual acts in Alabama and recognizing that a parents homosexuality is a
significant consideration in resolving custody disputes in that state).
65. See id. at *4 (concurring with the opinion of the majority in its finding that
the mother did not show a change of circumstance significant enough to warrant a
transfer of custody).
66. See Jay Reeves, Panel Rejects Lambda Bias Complaint, A SSOC. PRESS ONLINE, Mar.
21, 2002 (discussing a letter to the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
which notes that the Commission does not act against judges for languages in judicial
opinions), available at http:www.dadi.org/rjtchomo.htm; see also Dahleen Glanton,
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Of course, it may be that proponents of an expanded role for
anti-bias provisions would like to decrease public input in the
lawmaking process in some instances. For instance, it seems that
Professor Brown acknowledges the fact that the expanded
understanding of Canon 3 would work against public input in
lawmaking.67
E. Factions and the Underlying Structure of Government
Elsewhere I have raised the possibility that arguments such as those
made in favor of expanding the substantive reach of anti-bias
provisions could threaten the underlying structure of government.
This would give a faction in the legal profession almost unchecked
power over substantive lawmaking in contravention of one purpose of
the U.S. Constitutional system described in Federalist 10, the
68
balancing of different factional interests.
F.

Proposed Limitations

While the preceding considerations do not necessarily provide an
exhaustive framework for determining when unfair bias or prejudice
is at work, they do suggest certain important limitations on the scope
of bias provisions.
1. Bias provisions cannot constitute de facto constitutional
amendments creating new suspect classes or requiring
heightened scrutiny for new classifications.
2. The provisions cannot be used as a way to avoid the heavy
lifting required to enact legislation favorable to a certain class
of litigants.
3. The provisions also cannot serve to create categorical rules of
decision where fact specific balancing is currently required (i.e.
 the best interest of the child ).
Not only do these limitations help protect important policy
considerations regarding the roles of the respective branches of
government and the need for laws to be made only with the consent
Judge Unveils Biblical Sculpture, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 18, 2001, at A8 (indicating that
another possible contributing factor to Chief Justice Moores decision was his
obligation to the electorate, as he defeated his opponent in the election, fifty-five
percent to forty-five percent, by running a grass-roots campaign).
67. See Brown, supra note 3, at 446 n.352 (recognizing that states that have not
adopted Canon 3 are more likely to require judges to run for re-election as opposed
to relying on gubernatorial appointments).
68. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 182 (arguing that factional interests may lead to
 a corruption of one political process that could threaten marriage and
democracy ); see also THE F EDERALIST N O. 10 (James Madison).
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of the governed, they are also consistent with the purpose of the
provisions as promulgated. The  Scope section of the ABAs Model
Rules of Professional Conduct indicate that the Rules should be
69
 interpreted with reference to . . . the law itself. One commentator
has noted that the Code of Judicial Conduct and Rules of
Professional Responsibility are not meant to be treated as substantive
70
law beyond disciplinary settings.
It seems very unlikely that those states that have adopted the Code
of Judicial Conduct intended it to achieve a major overhaul in the
states legal philosophy and constitutional law. Alaska, Hawaii and
Nebraska all have constitutional amendments defining marriage as
71
the union of a man and a woman. The vast majority of the other
states that have adopted the new version of Canon 3 have statutes that
provide that marriages between same-sex couples will not be
72
recognized.
Only eight states have statutory provisions barring
73
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The states reflect
69. A.B.A. C TR. FOR PROFL RESP., A NNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
C ONDUCT xvi (4th ed. 1999).
70. See generally Podgor, supra note 5, at 1346-48 (discussing the negative
repercussions of using ethical rules in criminal trials of attorneys or judges).
71. See A LASKA C ONST. art. I, § 25 (stating that a valid marriage in Alaska exists
only between one man and one woman); HAW. C ONST. art. I, § 23 (maintaining that
the state legislature can reserve marriage to opposite sex couples); N EB. C ONST. art. I,
§ 29 (establishing that marriages between persons of the same sex will not be
recognized).
72. See A LA . C ODE § 30-1-19 (1998 & Supp. 2001) (prohibiting marriage between
persons of the same sex); A RIZ. REV. STAT. A NN . § 25-101 (West 2000) (stating that
marriage between persons of the same sex is void and prohibited); 2000 Cal. Legis.
Serv. Prop. 22 (2000) (establishing that the only valid marriage in the state is one
between a man and a woman); C OLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2001) (amending
Colorado law to limit marriage to a union between one man and one woman); DEL.
C ODE A NN . tit. 13, § 101 (1999) (establishing that marriages between people of the
same sex are void and prohibited); F LA. STAT. A NN . § 741.212 (West 2000) (stating
that marriages between persons of the same sex are not recognized by the state); GA.
C ODE A NN . § 19-3-3.1 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (failing to recognize marriages between
persons of the same sex); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-3 (1999) (establishing that only
marriages between one man and one woman are legal in the state); IDAHO C ODE §
32-209 (Michie 1996) (stating that same-sex marriages violate public policy); KAN .
STAT. A NN . § 23-101 (1995) (defining marriage as a civil contract between persons of
opposite sexes); MINN . STAT. A NN . § 517.01 (West 2002) (establishing that marriage is
only lawful when existing between persons of opposite sexes); N.D. C ENT. C ODE §
14-03-01 (1997) (limiting marriage to a union between one man and woman); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 43, § 3.1 (2001) (prohibiting marriage between persons of the same
gender); TENN . C ODE A NN . § 36-3-113 (2001) (stating that a marriage between one
man and one woman is the only legal marriage in the state); U TAH C ODE A NN . §
30-1-2 (1998) (stating that a marriage between persons of the same sex is
prohibited).
73. See C AL . GOVT C ODE § 12940 (2002) (making it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation); MASS. GEN . L AWS ch. 151B, § 4
(2002) (establishing that it is illegal for an employer to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation); MINN . STAT. A NN . § 363.03 (2002) (stating that discriminating on
the basis of sexual orientation is an unfair employment practice); N EV. REV. STAT.
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a variety of positions on sexual orientation discrimination and
sometimes an individual state has a number of seemingly conflicting
statutory policies. Surely a judicial ethics code cannot radically
modify this situation.
Finally, the inclusion of other classes in the anti-bias provisions of
Canon 3, such as  marital status, pregnancy, and  social or
economic status, which are not afforded constitutional heightened
scrutiny, indicate that the Canon was not intended to have such a
74
serious substantive effect.
C ONCLUSION
Even without the inclusion of sexual orientation as a discrete class
protected from judicial bias, it is probable that name-calling by judges
and attorneys is out of the realm of appropriate ethical behavior.
Likewise, prejudicing the fact-finder in a court setting by irrelevant
reference to personal characteristics or behavior of litigants is
 out-of-bounds regardless of the characteristic referenced. Beyond
this, though, can anti-bias provisions be said to have a substantive
effect on the law? For the reasons described here, the answer should
clearly be no. To find otherwise would be to introduce another kind
of bias into the legal system. It would mar the constitutional
structure of the nation and invite abuse of the political process by
judges. Perhaps most perilously, it would undermine the core value
of popular sovereignty and in so doing, provide a serious blow to the
independence of the judiciary and the integrity of the legal
profession.

A NN . § 613.330 (Michie 2001) (prohibiting discrimination or segregation on the
basis of sexual orientation); N.J. STAT. A NN . § 10:5-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002)
(establishing that discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation is an unfair
employment practice); R.I. GEN . L AWS § 28-5-7 (2000) (stating that refusing to hire
someone on the basis of sexual orientation is an unlawful employment practice); VT.
STAT. A NN . tit. 21, § 495 (2001) (stating that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is an unlawful employment practice); WIS. STAT. A NN . § 111.322 (West
1997 & Supp. 2001) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation).
74. See A K. CJC, Canon 3 (2002) (discussing that a judge should act impartially
while performing the duties of judicial office), available at http://www.state.ak.us/
courts/cjc/htm.
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